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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
validity

Has the Defendant/Appellant overcome the presumption of
of

the trial court's decision not to modify the

child

support award in the original Decree of Divorce?
2.

Did

the

trial court's apportionment of

the parties'

property work such a manifest injustice as to constitute an abuse
of discretion by the trial court?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a decision modifying a Decree of
Divorce issued by the Honorable Omer J. Call in The First
Judicial District in Box Elder County on November 28, 1984. The
original Decree divorced Respondent Jolene Hatch and Appellant
Scott Hatch from each other, awarded custody to the Appellant
during the school year and to Respondent during the summer,
ordered child support to be paid by Appellant during the summer
months, divided the parties' property, awarded Respondent alimony
for one year, and ordered Appellant to pay certain marital debts.
Each party thereafter sought a modification of the Decree of
Divorce, and on October 2, 1986, Judge Call issued a Memorandum
Decision.

On October 16, 1986, he issued an Order and Judgment

addressing the requests for modification, and modifying the
Decree with the regard to the property division.
Judge Call's modification order has been appealed by
Appellant Scott Hatch to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the original Decree of Divorce, Appellant Scott Hatch was
ordered to pay child support during the three summer months of
each year when the Respondent has custody.

Between the issuance

of the Decree and the modification hearing, Appellant had failed
to pay three months of support (T. 63). Appellant also failed to
make any alimony payments, despite the court's order (T. 108) and
despite the fact that Appellant earns $1,962.00 gross income per
month (T. 77).
5

Respondent Jolene Hatch's income has increased since the
original Decree of Divorce.

At the time of the Decree, she was

earning $654.00 net income per month (Memorandum Decision,
October 2, 1986, page 2), and by the time of the modification
hearing she had managed to obtain additional part-time employment
at minimum wage during the winter months (T. 116). This means
that during the winter months, Respondent earns approximately
$160.00 gross per month for her part-time work at Eagles (T.
115), and $576.00 gross per month for full-time work at King's
(T. 116, 146 - Respondent's salary from King's is calculated by
multiplying the minimum wage of $3.35/hour by forty hours per
week and then by 4.3 weeks).

Respondent's total gross income

during the winter months is therefore approximately $736.00 per
month.
During the summer months, Respondent maintains her part-time
job at Eagles for the $160.00 gross income per month, and has
also obtained construction work for the days during the summer
when work is available.

Respondent Jolene Hatch estimates that

her gross monthly income in the summer is approximately $750.00
(T. 115). Therefore, Respondent's total gross income in the
summer months is approximately $910.00 per month.

This is only

$256.00 per month more than she was earning at the time of the
original Decree during the summer and only $82.00 per month more
than she was earning during the winter.
It should be noted that the Appellant's brief on page 3
makes the assumption that Respondent "is still working the same
amount at Eagles" as she was working at the time of the original

6

Decree.

In fact, Respondent is only working ten hours per week

at Eagles at the same $4.00 per hour (T. 115). The assumption in
Respondent's brief is not cited to the transcript, and is not
supported by the evidence.
* With regard to the property division, in the original Decree
of Divorce issued in November 1984, Judge Call took into
consideration some of the damage to the house, and determined the
amount of equity to be awarded to the Respondent with those
offsets, among others, in mind (Memorandum Decision, October 2,
1986, page 3).

During the modification hearing, Appellant

asserted that there was further damage of which he was unaware
which took place between the couple's separation and the granting
of the divorce, and which he only discovered after he took
possession in December 1986 (T. 51).
Evidence adduced at the modification hearing shows that
Appellant Scott Hatch was in fact aware of much of the damage
being done to the house, particularly to the basement, both
through direct communication with his wife, the Respondent Jolene
Hatch (T. 133, 135, 136, 137, 220), and indirectly through his
father (T. 44). The damages to the upstairs portion of the house
were also known by Appellant, and some of those damages were
caused by him (T. 121). Although two appraisals prior to the
issuance of the original Divorce Decree reflected no serious
damage to the house, evidence also showed that the appraisals had
been done only from the outside (T. 103).
Judge Call, in his Memorandum Decision of October 2, 1986
(page 4), found that the Respondent should be responsible for
three-fourths of the damage and that the Appellant should be
7

responsible for one-fourth.

Judge Call after permitting all the

testimony on the damage requested by the Appellant (T. 14-25,
60)/ gleaned out those damages that had not been considered in
the original Decree and permitted Appellant an offset for them,
as well as offsets for other items requested by the Appellant
(Memorandum Decision, October 2, 1986, page 4).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Contrary to the assertion by the Appellant, the trial court
ruled on the child support issue and ordered that the original
Divorce Decree ordering the Appellant to pay child support remain
as entered, and not be modified.

The rule of judicial review of

a decision regarding divorce matters on appeal requires that the
appellant (1) rebut the presumption of validity of the findings
and judgment of the trial court, (2) show that the trial court's
findings of fact are contrary to the clear preponderance of the
evidence, and (3) prove that the trial court misunderstood or
misapplied the law to such an extent to result in a substantial
and prejudicial error abused its discretion to the extent that a
serious inequity or injustice has resulted.

The Appellant in

this case has not carried this burden and therefore the findings
and judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed.
With regard to the apportionment of the parties
the trial court decided to modify the original

property,

Divorce Decree

and allow the Appellant an offset for damage done to the house.
The Court heard all the evidence that the Appellant requested be
heard, and the Court made a decision on the basis of that
evidence.

The Appellant has not presented sufficient proof that
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the trial court's decision works such a manifest injustice as tot
constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I. THE APPELLANT HAS NOT CARRIED HIS BURDEN OF REBUTTING THE
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO
MODIFY THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD IN THE ORIGINAL DECREE.
Contrary to the assertion by the Appellant that Judge Call
failed to rule on the child support issue, the Order and Judgment
contains a paragraph stating the basis on which the Court decided
not to modify the original child support order, while the Order
itself states that n[t]he Decree of Divorce in this case shall
remain as entered, except as specifically modified herein."
Judgment and Order, October 16, 1987, page 3.

Since the only

things modified in the October 16, 1987 Order are the Appellant's
offset for damage to the house and other offsets, the trial court
ruled on the child support issue and decided that it not be
modified.
Even if this Court were to find that the trial court
inadvertently failed to rule on the Appellant's request to modify
the original child support order, the trial court did state in
its Memorandum Decision and in its Findings of Fact that there
had not been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant

a

modification of the child support order.
In Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court reiterated the rules of judicial review of a
decision regarding divorce matters on appeal.
that

9

The Court stated

although [a divorce] case is in equity and [the Court
is] free to review both the law and the facts . . .
[the Court]^placets] a presumption of validity upon the
trial court's actions in divorce cases. Thus the
burden is on the appellant to show error, and [the
Court] will overturn the trial court's findings of fact
only if they are contrary to the clear preponderance of
the evidence . . . [The Court] will overturn the trial
court's judgment where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error or where there has been
such an abuse of discretion that an inequity or
injustice has resulted.
(Citations omitted)
The Appellant in this case has not carried the required burden
and therefore this Court should not disturb the judgment of the
trial court that the child support order should not me modified.
If this Court determines that it will review the facts in
this case to determine whether the trial court's findings are
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence, the Court,
upon reviewing the transcript, will discover that the
Respondent's income has increased slightly ($256.00 per month in
the winter months and $82.00 in the summer months), bringing her
monthly gross income to $736.00 in the winter and $910.00 in the
summer (Memorandum Decision, October 2, 1986, T. 115, 116, 146).
The Appellant's monthly income has also increased approximately
$.83 per hour (Order and Judgment, October 16, 1986, page 2),
bringing his monthly gross income to $1962.00 (T. 77).
Respondent's slight increase in income does not constitute a
substantial change in circumstances.
Once this Court reviews the evidence, if it deems such a
review necessary under the Berger rules of appellate review cited
above, it will be required to determine if there has been a
substantial change of circumstances.
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).

Woodward v. Woodward, 709

Unless this Court finds an abuse of
10

discretion on the part of the trial court, it must affirm the
trial court's refusal to find any substantial change in circumstances of the parties that would warrant the imposition of
support payments by the Respondent.

Id.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OF THE PARTIES' PROPERTY
DOES NOT WORK SUCH A MANIFEST INJUSTICE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The standard for review of property apportionment in divorce
cases was set out in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah
1986), as follows:
This Court endows the trial court's adjustment of
financial interests of the parties with a presumption
of validity and does not review their values absent a
clear abuse of discretion . . . We do not lightly
disturb property divisions made by the trial court and
uphold its decision except where to do so would work a
manifest injustice or inequity.
This standard was reiterated most recently in Rayburn v. Rayburn,
59 UAR 42, 44 (5/29/87), in which this Court stated that n[o]n
appellate review, that trial court's apportionment of property
will not be disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.11
In Berger v. Berger, supra at 698, the defendant contended
that certain pieces of real property which were awarded to the
plaintiff were undervalued.

The Utah Supreme Court in that case

stated that it had examined the valuations and decided to refrain
from disturbing any of them since they were all based on
competent evidence.

The Court also stated that their value was

in issue at the trial, and the trial court, within its rightful
discretion, made the valuation decision it saw fit.
The trial court in this case, after hearing and considering
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all the evidence requested by the Appellant, determined that
Appellant is entitled to a greater offset than was initially
determined in the original Decree of Divorce.

It is the

Respondent's view that Judge Call was more than fair in hearing
the evidence and in apportioning the fault for the damage to the
house.

A certain portion of the damage and some of the offsets

were considered when the original Decree was issued, and the
remainder thereof were judiciously weighed when the requests for
modification of the Decree was heard.
The Appellant has not carried his burden of proving that
Judge Call abused his discretion or committed substantial and
prejudicial error that deprived the Appellant of a full and fair
presentation of his case.

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake

City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1974).
Nor has the Appellant proved that the findings of the trial court
would work a manifest injustice or inequity.

In the absence of

such proof, the findings and judgment of the trial court should
not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
The findings and judgment of the trial court in the
modification order should be upheld.

The Appellant has not

carried his burden of rebutting the presumption of validity of
those findings and judgment.

After a full and fair hearing,

Judge Call found that there was not a sufficient change of
circumstances to warrant imposition of child support payments
upon the Respondent.

He also found that the original Decree of

Divorce was required to be modified to take into account offsets
and damage that had not been considered at the original trial.
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Rather than be seen as an abuse of discretion, the trial court's
indulgence and careful consideration of the facts should be
applauded.
Respondent Jolene Hatch respectfully submits that the
findings and decision of the trial court b^ affirmed,
DATED this

1 Y

day of July,

Attorney/for plaintiff/Respondent
P.O. Box 1T1—
123 East Main
Tremonton, Utah 84337
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